

Forthcoming: *Rationality and Society*

Portrait of a Failed Rebellion:
An Account of Rational, Sub-optimal Violence in Western Uganda

By LUCY HOVIL AND ERIC WERKER*

Abstract

While newspaper reports typically describe anti-civilian violence in civil war as resulting from hatred or anarchy, there is an emerging literature that interprets these processes as calculated, strategic actions of war makers. We argue that this literature overestimates the strategic value of violence by focusing on conflicts where this strategy is used deliberately and on a massive scale. Our analysis examines the violence in a failed, peripheral rebellion in western Uganda and finds that the brutality was premeditated; however the gains to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels were not military. Instead, we argue that anti-civilian violence in western Uganda stems from the financier-insurgent relationship that promoted a high level of violence in response to divergent interests, unequal access to information, and contracting limitations. In other words, civilians were victimized in order that the ADF could keep their outside funding.

Key words: civilian violence; civil war; insurgency; war financing; Uganda.

* Authors' names listed alphabetically. Refugee Law Project, Makerere University, P.O. Box 6016, Kampala, Uganda; Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. E-mails: research@refugeelawproject.org; werker@fas.harvard.edu. This draft: February 23, 2004. We wish to thank Robert Bates, Zachary Lomo, Charles Cohen, Robert Trager, Jeremy Weinstein, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Winifred Agabo, Emmanuel Bagenda, and Elias Lubega provided excellent research assistance in Uganda. We are grateful to the Ugandan National Council on Science and Technology for permission to conduct the field research. We also wish to thank the government officials and members of the NGO community in Bundibugyo and Kampala who facilitated our work. Most of all, we are indebted to the victims of the conflict in Bundibugyo who shared their time and concerns with us. Eric Werker was on a Mellon Inter-University Program on Non-Governmental Organizations and Forced Migrations grant at the time of the research. The usual caveat applies.

I. Introduction

Articles in the popular press commonly depict the socially devastating outcomes of intrastate war as resulting from banditry, hatred, or anarchy. At the same time, conflict literature has begun to model these outcomes as resulting from rational, optimizing behavior on the part of war makers. The constraints and reward structures that belligerents face, the arguments go, make the targeting of civilians beneficial in some situations. Whereas the press's view of famine in war sees a breakdown of social order, for example, a nuanced view considers the deprivation of food to a community as serving the military aims of a particular side in the conflict.

Most data for rational violence consist of case studies from especially salient wars. Several of Africa's civil wars created such massive famines that scholars seeking to make sense of food being used as a weapon tailor their theories to be consistent with the major crises (Macrae and Zwi 1992). Likewise, the widespread use of amputations in Sierra Leone was so ruthless that it must have been calculated; indeed, human rights reports on the conflict describe the tactics as "deliberate" and "systematic" (Amnesty International Canada 2000; Human Rights Internet 2000). Unfortunately, choosing conspicuous data points leads to selection bias, thereby causing us to overestimate the advantage to war makers of such social calamities. Moreover, given that these calamities coincide with military advantage, we jump to infer intention from outcome, crediting the military leader with the sober pursuit of war aims.

Yet even failed or peripheral rebellions contain their share of socially devastating outcomes that inflict tremendous distress on civilian populations. The mere presence of targeted civilians does not, of course, ensure that an ingenious campaign is being mounted. Indeed, there are two rather strong assumptions in the majority of the rational violence literature. The first is that the violence is rationally chosen: it is calculated. Under this assumption, the belligerent chooses to inflict civilian suffering from among the space of potential tactics. Rather than confront the enemy army or purchase a tank, for instance, the war maker consciously and deliberately expends his resources on forcibly displacing a population. The second assumption is that the violence against the civilians is crucial to the

war aims of the belligerent. War makers conduct their campaigns in which the calamities they inflict on civilians are a fundamental part of the war strategy.

These strong assumptions are effective in explaining particularly flagrant episodes of civilian violence—when the rebellion is effective enough to be noticed and the violence brutal enough to be deliberate. Yet bringing the same assumptions to ineffectual insurgencies may be asking too much of some clumsy warlords. After all, though economists regularly assume profit maximization, none would actually believe that all firms are perfectly optimizing. But if we were to relax these assumptions such that violence against civilians is neither calculated nor crucial to the war aims, we would end up with the typical explanation of the popular press, that mayhem and hatred prevail. This also seems intuitively unappealing. In Section II, after describing some of the rational and functional violence literature, we relax each assumption in turn and describe violence that is either “adventitious” (not necessarily calculated, yet still crucial to the war aim) or “coupled” (calculated, but an unfortunate by-product of conducting some other policy).

In Section III we present a portrait of a failed rebellion. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in western Uganda consist of recruits from across Uganda and possible remnants of the National Army of the Liberation of Uganda and from the defunct Rwenzururu movement. Beginning in 1996, they have mounted an insurgency against the Kampala government. A year of low-level activity and civilian toleration were followed by four years of violent raids on villages that involved theft, the abduction of women and conscripts, and the killing of villagers. In the province of Bundibugyo alone, approximately 140,000 out of 180,000 were internally displaced at the height of the conflict. In 2003, the rebellion had all but disappeared, with most displaced returned to their villages and the government of Uganda offering amnesty to combatants who turned in their arms. The ADF never controlled a populated area and the leaders never gained positions of influence within the Kampala government.

Section IV evaluates different explanations of the violence against civilians and the forced displacement that occurred in this failed rebellion. We reject the rational, functional explanation in favor of a calculated but coupled violence that stems from the relationship of the insurgents with their financiers abroad. That the ADF rely on external financing may be the crucial factor in explaining a violence that is of questionable strategic value. We model

the financier-insurgent relationship as a principal-agent problem and discuss three reasons why a sub-optimal use of civilian violence may result. One, the financier may have differing goals from the insurgent, forcing the latter to occasionally undertake a policy not in his best interest in order to sustain the funding ties. Two, the insurgent may be forced to undertake drastic, highly visible campaigns in order to signal to the financier that he is committed to the rebellion—if the financier observes the insurgent lying low, he is unable to tell whether the insurgent is choosing the correct policy or simply shirking. Three, the only way to contract insurgency may be through financing actions rather than results; this would lead to campaign-heavy insurgency that avoids the quiet work of winning hearts and minds.

This model has drastic implications for conflict resolution and counterinsurgency techniques that are less harmful to civilian populations caught in the crossfire. These policy implications, along with a discussion of their applicability in other areas of the world, are discussed in Section V. As it turns out, externally financed, violent insurgencies are fairly common, and the logic of their violence may differ from the immediate rationalist's conclusion.

With this article we seek to make four contributions to the literature of violence in civil war. First, we produce a typology of different explanations of violence in war, providing one snapshot view with which to organize this emerging literature. Second, we add to the list of case studies a war that is neither salient nor successful, and describe the violence that occurred. Third, we propose a theory of funded rebellion that explains a high level of counterproductive civilian violence, remains within the rationalist framework, and is consistent with the ADF insurgency in western Uganda. Finally, we suggest casualty-minimizing policy recommendations that follow from this analysis.

II. Rational violence in civil war

Civil wars today are characterized by high levels of violence against civilians (Kaldor 1999: 8) even as successful revolutions have often occurred without heavy casualties (Gurr and Goldstone 1991: 339). The regularity and scope of this violence are somewhat surprising given that both the insurgents and the incumbents are competing for the loyalty of the very citizens who are being targeted. Moreover, the violence can take on many forms, including

massacres, forced displacement, starvation, mass rape, and disfigurement. On the surface, these phenomena seem the result of disorder and malice. Indeed, such is the conventional explanation of violent civil war found in the popular press. In a typical article, this *Associated Press* (AP) release describes a week where around 100 people were killed in the conflict in Indonesian Borneo:

The violence highlights the breakdown of law and order in Indonesia as the archipelago emerges from more than three decades of authoritarian rule and old ethnic hatreds erupt into bloodshed. (Brummit 2001).

In this description, violence stems from underlying animosity and is a signal of disorder. It is in response to this character of analysis that the literature of rational violence defines itself.

Perhaps the largest question in this literature is why civilians are killed in large numbers.¹ Kalyvas (1999) proposes that targeted mass terror is used both to punish and deter defection. Analyzing the massacres of civilians in Algeria, he finds that the rebels selectively targeted individuals and their families and committed more massacres when rule was unstable. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) examine mass killings by the state using a database of all large-scale armed conflicts from 1945-2000. Their data suggest that mass killings are more likely to be perpetrated against guerrilla uprisings (as those tend to rely on civilian populations for support); when there is an actual threat to the regime; and when civilians are supplying help to the guerrillas.

Beyond outright killing, other modalities of violence against civilians are scrutinized from a rational perspective. Keene (1994) describes the famine in southern Sudan as an intentional counterinsurgency strategy that disrupted economic life in the south and created profits for those supporting the government by moving the terms of trade against the famine victims. Examining the displacement in Kosovo, Hayden (1998) argues that the forced migration was a fundamental part of the war aim of establishing “ethnically pure” political units.

¹ This is separate from the literature on the rationality of war (see Fearon 1995) and on genocide, where the objective is not so much to win the war as to annihilate the opponent. However, it has been suggested that some genocide or politicide may be triggered during wartime as a military strategy (Melson 1992; Krain 1997). Such a method of killing would be consistent with the rational violence we are investigating.

These authors share the view that violence is both rationally carried out and fundamental to the war aims of the perpetrators. “The central thesis is that massacres can be understood as part of a rational strategy aiming to punish and deter civilian defection under specific constraints” (Kalyvas 1999: 245). “We argue that far from the unintended but inevitable side effects of combat, the killing of civilians in times of war is often part of a deliberate policy of mass killing against noncombatant populations” (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). “The use of famine as a cheap counterinsurgency tactic was a technique of long standing in Sudan” (Keene 1994: 113). “Forced displacement resulting in both internally displaced persons and refugees is an intentional, deliberate strategy of the parties to the internal conflict, and not just a consequence or unintended effect of the hostilities between ethnic Albanians and Serbs” (Hayden 1998: 1).

We do not cite these articles in order to take issue with the authors’ conclusions; in fact, they are quite reasonable and creative. We do quote them to draw attention to the dual assumptions that the violence is both calculated and crucial to the war aims. While these two assumptions seem to hold in the cases the authors have chosen, there is no reason to believe that they should extend to all violence against civilians in civil war. Relaxing each assumption in turn generates two plausible explanations for the existence of socially destructive outcomes in conflict.

Figure A describes a typology of violence in civil war, where we label the calculated, directly beneficial violence described by the above authors as “strategic” and the uncalculated, incidental violence depicted in the popular press as “anarchical.”² The remaining two boxes are interesting accounts of violence and relatively under-explored in the literature.

[Insert Figure A somewhere near here]

We label violence against civilians that is uncalculated yet still crucial to the war aim of the belligerent as “adventitious.” This might occur where individual rebels, acting out of self-interest rather than for the rebellion as a whole, perpetrate acts of violence that

² Anarchy need not be disorderly as Hirshleifer (1995) discusses. Yet depictions of civil war violence in the popular press suggest a disorderly interpretation.

unwittingly serve the goals of the rebellion. An example is Somalia just prior to the UN intervention, when both Mohamed Farrah Aidid and Ali Mahdi could—quite credibly—claim that they did not control all of their gunmen (Peterson and Robinson 1992). They thus left themselves the option to attack US troops, thanks to the violent banditry the gunmen were already known for. Such an explanation of violence would be most applicable to conflicts where the foot soldiers enjoy liberty to pursue their own small objectives which cumulatively, even if haphazardly, contribute to the progress of the larger conflict. Civil wars over natural resources may provide case studies that illustrate this explanation best. To our knowledge, there are no theoretical studies that specifically adopt an adventitious understanding of violence to analyze a particular conflict.³

An adventitious view of violence concedes that there are elements of chance that can have a defining role in the outcome of a conflict. Certainly a historian would not take issue with such an idea. And that generals choose to allow the continuation of advantageous violence is consistent with an evolutionary view of tactics. However, both the adventitious and the strategic views of violence in conflict clearly cannot explain violence that is counterproductive to the war aims of the belligerent. For such violence to not be anarchical and still fit within a rationalist framework, the assumption that violence is crucial to the war outcome must be relaxed. Such a view of violence we label “coupled,” where the belligerent fulfils some goal and in the process generates a useless or counterproductive violence. The important feature of a coupled explanation of violence is that it is in the interest of the belligerent to pursue a certain war policy *even though* he knows that it will result in nonessential or injurious violence against civilians. This violence is not desired by the war makers but must be endured if its attached policy is to be pursued.

Reviewing the literature on civil war violence, we find very few coupled interpretations of violence. One notable exception is economist Eli Berman’s (2003) model of radical religious militias. Seeking to explain “destructive acts from which individuals derive no direct benefit” (1), Berman views these unpopular and violent acts as signals of commitment by militia members to the group which lower their outside options. Since

³ While she doesn’t pursue the point much further, Kaldor (1999: 56) advocates an adventitious understanding of the ethnic cleansing by Serb forces in Croatia: “It is probably more convincing to argue that the strategy of ethnic cleansing was developed on the ground, although prior discussions and experience must have had some relevance.”

militias are undermined by defection of members, those militias that can reduce defections should stand the highest probability of succeeding in campaigns. One way to minimize defection, according to Berman, is to require high sacrifices from members. Potential members with high outside options will be less likely to make these sacrifices, thereby limiting the collection of actual members to those with lower likelihood of defecting. Moreover, if the sacrifices are of the precise variety as to reduce outside options, defection will be even less likely. Committing violent or unpopular acts against civilians, in a public manner, is both a costly sacrifice (thereby a signal of commitment) and a reduction in outside options (because a village will be less likely to welcome back a soldier who has inflicted suffering on the community). Thus violence is required to increase group loyalty, and not a direct tactic to secure military advantage.

Indeed, we witness such activities in African militias as well. In Mozambique, a common RENAMO practice to initiate child soldiers was to force them to kill someone in their home village in such a way that the community knew the child had killed (Goodwin-Gill and Cohn 1994: 27). This practice is hardly the voluntary sacrifice of Berman's model but nonetheless is extremely effective in lowering the option value to the child of defecting from RENAMO.

Another coupled interpretation of violence concerns its employment in order to instigate an aggressive counter-reaction, thereby widening the chasm between two groups and facilitating group cohesion (see Fearon and Laitin 2000: 865-868). For example, Jenkins (1970) writes that one of the goals of urban insurgents is to provoke the authorities into an oppressive response, which can then be used as fodder in the guerrilla's information campaign:

Violence against candidates and polling places may cause the government to call off elections, perhaps even announce a state of siege, suspend civil liberties, and declare martial law. The thought is rapture to urban guerrillas. The government then can be denounced as dictatorial.

(11)

The violence against candidates is not simply to instill terror or stop elections: it is to incite the government to revoke civil liberties and create further discontent among the population.

We now turn to the Allied Democratic Forces insurgency in western Uganda and examine whether its stylized facts are consistent with any of the above interpretations of civil war violence.

III. A description of the ADF rebellion

The ADF conflict began in late 1996 with an incursion into Uganda from what is now the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The rebels were originally comprised of recruits from across Uganda as well as possible remnants of the National Army of the Liberation of Uganda and the defunct Rwenzururu movement, both regional insurgencies. In the initial stages of the conflict, the Rwenzori Mountains that border DRC offered a base from which to carry out attacks and a supply route to the outside. By late 1997, the rebels began to target civilians—characterized by killing, looting, and forcible recruitment—with heavy attacks continuing throughout 1998. A particularly notorious attack took place on 8 June 1998, when rebels invaded Kicwamba Technical Institute in Kabarole district and not only abducted over 200 civilians, mostly children, but set a locked dormitory on fire, burning to death approximately 80 students (Achieng 1999).

The intensity of the attacks drove many civilians out of their homes into newly created camps for internally-displaced persons (IDPs), and by mid-2000 approximately 175,000 people had been displaced within the region, the majority in Bundibugyo district (African Rights 2001: 20). The scale of displacement created a complete loss of livelihoods, and the local economy—based on agricultural commodities such as cocoa, vanilla and coffee—collapsed when farmers were forced to abandon their land (IRIN 2002). In addition to living standards being chronically low (Oxfam 2002), insecurity remained a problem in the IDP camps: violent rebel attacks continued, despite the presence of the Ugandan army.

It is widely believed that the ADF received funding from a number of external sources, including Mobutu's Zaire, the Sudan government, Al Qaeda and other radical Islamists.⁴ Due to these alleged links, the ADF was included on the US "Terrorist Exclusion List" following the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre (US Department of

⁴ Interview with regional security expert, Kampala, May 2003. Also, Byman et al (2001: 16) confirm Sudan and Congo as outside sponsors, and US Department of State (2002b: 115-116) confirms Sudan as a supporter of the ADF.

State 2002a). Most recently, documents purportedly written by Bekkah Abdul Nassir, the “self-described chief of diplomacy” of the ADF, were found in the Iraqi intelligence headquarters. These documents discussed budgets, attack capabilities, and the possibility of training in Baghdad (Smucker and Bowers 2003).

Reports on the ground confirm the origins of such funding, largely by association. For instance, the district chairperson in Bundibugyo claimed that “an Arab” was once killed amongst the rebels, and reported the presence of Arabic writing on boxes of supplies that were captured.⁵ A Ugandan intelligence officer talked of how the ADF obtained assistance through Sudan. He claimed that eight trailers of arms came in before the conflict began, and that the DRC was used as a “reception centre.”⁶

These global sources of funding reveal the wider geopolitical context in which the ADF rebellion, a seemingly Ugandan war, was taking place. As is well known, the period 1996-2001 saw an intricate web of conflict, arms trafficking, mineral extraction, and rebel movements in the region. The Sudanese government was sponsoring the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group in Uganda’s north; the Ugandan government was allegedly assisting southern Sudanese insurgencies; large numbers of *genocidaires* as well as Rwandese and Ugandan troops were active in the eastern DRC. Thus, although localized in its direct impact, the ADF rebellion was firmly linked to the international arena.

An undocumented rebellion

Although the ADF rebellion is a war that is essentially over, the violence that took place remains largely undocumented. Only two substantial reports have been written on the war to date. The first is a study by African Rights (2001) that places the conflict in historical and geopolitical context. It is based on interviews with civilians in the area, as well as a number of ex-combatants. The second, informed by household questionnaires and interviews with displaced persons, is a collaborative report by Oxfam, Kabarole Research Centre, and the German Development Service (2002), that describes the IDP situation.

The lack of analysis on the conflict is compounded by the fact that the war has received so little national and international attention. Only major massacres in the region

⁵ Interview with government official, Bundibugyo, 12 Aug 2002,

⁶ Interview with intelligence officer, Kampala, Aug 2002.

tended to make it into the press, in particular the attack on a group of tourists in Bwindi National Park on the border with DRC in February 1999.⁷ Although such selective publicity is not unusual, the invisibility of the war adds to the dearth of available sources.

The dearth of information on the war is matched by a paucity of explanations. The conflict has been described as a “rebellion without a cause”: the rebels never communicated a coherent set of grievances nor gave any indication of a political agenda (African Rights 2001: 1-4). Some bystanders see the insurgency as little more than the activity of a criminal network. Others view the ADF as a pro-Muslim group, specifically associated with the Salaf Tabliq sect. For example, the district commissioner talked of the ADF as “Islamic fundamentalists who believe they should actually capture the whole world. Their leadership were indoctrinated in Sudan and some in Afghanistan.”⁸ Yet for most citizens with whom we spoke, there was continued confusion about the rebels’ motivation beyond a vague acknowledgement that they were fighting “the government.”

To add to the confusion, the majority of ex-combatants denied that there was a specific Islamic agenda to the struggle. As one ex-combatant said, “the agenda of the ADF was purely political. The religious aspect came later as a way to get support and recruits . . . the ADF adapted the grievances of Islam in order to appeal to these people. Many of the young recruits also happened to be Muslim so the number of Muslims in ADF grew. Islam was a ticket, so the leaders disguised their political motives in religion.”⁹

Given the lack of credible explanations and documentation on the conflict, this paper is based largely on the few existing sources as well as extensive new primary evidence. A week of field research in Bundibugyo and follow-up work in Kampala allowed us to interview civilians, government officials, humanitarian workers, and ex-combatants. In addition, we were able to secure access to documents and correspondence seized from a number of ADF soldiers during the government of Uganda’s anti-insurgency campaign.

In the case of the former, as with the African Rights and Oxfam reports, when interviewing people from the area it was sometimes impossible to confirm information

⁷ The attackers are thought to have included ADF elements alongside remnants of the *Interahamwe*, Rwandese Hutu militias who are held responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

⁸ Interview with government official, Bundibugyo, 12 Aug 2002. Interestingly, Rohan Gunaratna, author of *Inside Al Qaeda*, confirms that members of the ADF trained in Sudan and Afghanistan (Smucker and Bowers 2003).

⁹ Interview with ex-combatant #3, Kampala, 17 Oct 2002.

received. Moreover, interviews with civilians may be biased as there would be reluctance to admit to rebel cooperation, while government officials were keen to put themselves in a positive light. In addition, the interviews with ex-combatants took place in a context in which there was growing anger at the inability of the government to deliver on its promises of assistance as laid out in a 2000 amnesty act (see BBC 1999). As a result, they were acutely aware of the need to try to improve their public image and were less likely to admit to having committed atrocities. For instance, all the former ADF soldiers we interviewed denied that the ADF had been responsible for the killing of students at the Technical Institute in 1998, instead blaming the incident on the Ugandan troops who did it to tarnish the reputation of the ADF.

Unlike the interviews, which show an awareness of their audience, the seized documents offer a more candid view of the situation. Although we were unable to confirm the validity of the documents, there are several reasons to believe their authenticity. The documents were obtained during an unannounced visit to a government official sympathetic towards our research goals. The collection includes correspondence written in English, Luganda, and Swahili; a variety of different types of papers, ink, and handwriting distinguish the documents. Moreover, as will become apparent in the following section, the release of much of this material would be of no strategic interest for the government.

Drawing upon these different sources, we characterize the conflict from the perspective of the rebels, the civilians, and the government.

The ADF

In the initial stages of the conflict, the ADF appears to have purchased supplies and obtained information from civilians with relative ease. Given the low economic development of the area, it was not hard to find collaborators or traders at a time when the ADF was not associated with the atrocities that were to follow. As one ex-combatant told us of the first year of war, “We were using money to get food and supplies.”¹⁰ Rebel leaders continued to recruit Ugandans from across the country with the promise of money and education (African Rights 2001: 8), and began their anti-government campaign.

¹⁰ Interview with ex-combatant #13, Kampala, 24 Oct 2002.

However, by late 1997 the war had begun to intensify and civilians were regular targets for attack. Looting of supplies, abductions, and the killing of civilians became prevalent within the region, particularly in Bundibugyo district. It appears that such actions were generally the objective of raids: “our boys managed to kill 19 civilians. . . they managed to abduct 7 young boys,”¹¹ a field officer relayed to his superior. However, at rare times, anti-civilian actions seem to have been unauthorized action on the part of individual rebels who were then reprimanded by their superiors. For instance, in one letter, a rebel commander, Umeme, described how foot soldiers occasionally stepped out of line: “Some of our brothers are greedy, hence taking their personal interests as a privilege up to the extent of pretending to forget what they are supposed to be or do.” He goes on to relate a number of incidents, including a “soldier” stealing a “civilian” shirt who was later made to return it. They wanted to punish him in front of the civilians, but he pleaded and was pardoned “because he was new in our community and we are still teaching him our behaviour.”¹²

In another document, there is a description of one rebel shooting another in the legs in order to stop him from firing upon a civilian.¹³ This suggests a correlation between the intensification of attacks and growing tension within the ADF ranks on the role and use of violence as a means of coercion. Umeme’s report testifies to this:

A group went to a village and pretended to be UPDF [Ugandan People’s Defence Forces; the Ugandan army], but at last changed to their normal colour of ADF. Later on, they reached the extent of borrowing 20 cups of beans worth 6000/= [Ugandan shillings] from the owner for that home and promised him that Uhuru mobile unit was to pay. By surprise, the man has run away seeking refuge again—he only comes to dig, then back to his hiding place. Now there’s a step to take so as to convince him back, yet this man was the last one with his family on the hills just on the outskirts of the forest and our brothers have been using him to get informations whenever they get out of the forest. Therefore, sir, we may be constructing as well as destroying.¹⁴

¹¹ Monthly report from the “Office of Intelligence, Allied Democratic Forces” to “The Derrick,” 1 Jan 1999. Seized document. Orthographic errors on all seized documents were corrected for clarity, though English spellings and some idiosyncrasies were preserved.

¹² Letter from Umeme to “The Starfish,” 30 Sep 1999, seized document.

¹³ Untitled document dated 13 May 1999.

¹⁴ Letter from Umeme to “The Starfish,” 30 Sep 1999, seized document.

This quotation shows surprise at the extent to which civilians are leaving their homes as a result of ADF activity: the civilian in question clearly has other ideas about his safety. We are also able to witness the rebel's recognition that the use of violence is having a negative impact on a civilian population that is desperately needed as an ongoing resource. Umeme further writes: "it is well known that UPDF do not take things like: children, civilians' clothes, goats. . . [our tactics] may result to civilians running away from their areas or rather seek to work on UPDF politics."

Irrespective of such debates over strategy within the ADF, the outcome was the near-total displacement of population from the villages into IDP camps. After the villages were deserted, the rebels began to attack civilians in the IDP camps. Furthermore, the condition of displacement was used as the substance for the rebels' continuing anti-government campaign, as evidenced in this written message from the rebels to IDPs:

Allow me to flash you briefly on the recurred problems you are facing while the government is seated comfortably watching you without steps taken to restore the situation . . . Hunger is in your neck whereas the district officers are feeding on your money collected as tax. Diseases such as cholera, typhoid, malaria, etc. are claiming lives daily due to absence of medical services and facilities in the district. Your children have lagged behind as far as education is concerned.¹⁵

The attacks on the camps appear to have been desperate acts in a period of financial destitution for the insurgents. A monthly report written by an ADF intelligence officer describes the conditions: "Soldiers lack blankets, clothings, especially the weak ones. . . As regards the 9 women left in Bundibugyo, they've experienced hardship in getting food because of their weakness, they lack clothing, shoes, blankets and shelter."¹⁶ The continuation of raids on the camps was generating some resources, but clearly not enough to go around. For instance in a letter written to a superior, a combatant asks for assistance, saying he needs food to live on, including for his pregnant wife who is not very well.¹⁷

¹⁵ Letter to "All District Natives/Residences" from Secretary Bamba Desk ADF Combatants. No date. Seized document.

¹⁶ Monthly report from the "Office of Intelligence, Allied Democratic Forces" to "The Derrick," 1 Jan 1999. Seized document.

¹⁷ Letter written in Luganda, 3 Jun 2000, to "Afande," meaning sir in Swahili.

The documents suggest the extent to which everything taken during raids was supposed to be accounted for in minute detail; that raids appear to have been opportunities for each unit to generate its own supplies; and that combat units did not have *carte blanche* to conduct these operations at their own discretion. “When someone can’t go in operations it is very difficult to get clothes,” one insurgent reports.¹⁸ Interestingly, even with the violent raids being conducted by the field units, money seems to be flowing from the top to the field. This complex financing, not surprisingly, was a source for tension:

The message you sent . . . reached me, but unfortunately not the whole amount as it was from you. . . He says they spent the other lot to buy food stuff on their way from there to this place. For me I do not see how they could have needed the money. First of all they carried out an operation 2 days before they arrived here. Secondly, of the arrival as they were approaching us they went to the wrong place first. They also said they were delayed because they had sent a villager to purchase food for them but they had not returned with the food and due to this they had used the rest of the money. In my opinion I do not see where they would spend money anyhow.¹⁹

Similarly another rebel complains that his superior has not given him a “wife” yet: “Python allowed me to look for a girl but I’m still hesitant—for me I prefer a girl who has stayed a long time with us whom I don’t suspect to escape. What about that side? Is there no girl you left for me? But Afande, it seems you care less about me!”²⁰

Civilians

For civilians caught up in the conflict, such dilemmas were not an issue. The apparently indiscriminate acts of violence perpetrated against them in their own homes left them with no choice but to leave, despite the profound disruption to their lives. Although they tolerated the rebels initially, once levels of violence intensified there was universal evacuation of homesteads. As one displaced person, a former member of parliament in the 1960s, said: “When you see someone has been killed, you have to go. And then the

¹⁸ Monthly report from the “Office of Intelligence, Allied Democratic Forces” to “The Derrick,” 1 Jan 1999. Seized document.

¹⁹ Letter to Afande Kiku, translated from Luganda, 30 Apr 2000.

²⁰ Letter from Kambale Obeid, 8 Apr 2000.

government said we should move nearby the road so that we can get security there . . . My neighbours remained, they were two. But then they were killed by the rebels. So everybody left.”²¹ We were unable to ascertain whether the attacks were targeted or indiscriminate; regardless, they resulted in total displacement.

This displacement was exacerbated by government policies that essentially forced villagers to leave conflict zones. Due to the scale of displacement, anyone who remained was assumed to be a sympathizer, and moving to the camps became proof of not being an informer or collaborator. An IDP wished that the Ugandan soldiers would not “think civilians in villages are collaborators, because the moment you remain there the UPDF will fire at you.”²² In addition, despite having moved into what the government called “protected villages,” inadequate protection meant that civilians continued to be attacked by the rebels: the killing, abductions, and looting continued.

Government of Uganda

The impact on the civilian population reflects not only the intensity of ADF attacks, but also the inability or reluctance of the UPDF to protect people in the villages and the camps. However, with the appointment of Brigadier James Kazini to the region in 1999 and a corresponding increase in UPDF presence, the course of the war began to alter (African Rights 2001: 25). In particular, mountain combat units targeted the hold the rebels had over the mountain/borderland region, challenging their supply routes and targeting encampments. Field correspondence from an insurgent confirms the effectiveness of this counterinsurgency tactic:

The enemy has changed their system of attacking our camps to guerrilla tactics, this by laying ambushes in our roads and a system of tiptoeing which caused us to lose one soldier so far and one up to now still missing. We’ve also lost our soldiers’ belongings. That system has forced us to change whatever road known by the enemy.²³

²¹ Interview in Hakitengya IDP Camp, 13 Aug 2002.

²² Interview in Harugale IDP camp, 12 Aug 2002.

²³ Monthly report from the “Office of Intelligence, Allied Democratic Forces” to “The Derrick,” 1 Jan 1999. Seized document.

This anti-insurgency tactic within Uganda was accompanied by the well-known campaign in eastern DRC, where Ugandan troops occupied territory in order to prevent the ADF from using the Congo as a sanctuary, among other more controversial reasons.

Violence and forced displacement

The dynamics around the issue of displacement, as the most visible sign of the impact of the violence, present many of the dilemmas of the war itself. Regardless of whether displacement was intentional or not, the emptying out of villages had gains as well as costs for the ADF. The main benefits for the rebels were that it complicated the government's intelligence efforts, enabled the occupation of territory left vacant and the use of supplies left behind, and portrayed the government as unable to protect the people in their own homes. However, these gains had corresponding costs: the rebels lost civilian production, alienated future supporters, and could no longer hide among civilians.²⁴

In addition, many of the advantages of the campaigns of violence were gained during the initial stage of displacement: the rebels could use goods left behind and occupy vacant homes. However, such advantages began to dwindle as resources ran out and villagers were not able to replant the fields and care for the animals. Thus while displacement was highly effective as a one-off event, it became increasingly disadvantageous to the rebels over time. Because of the irrevocable nature of displacement within the context of continued violence, such replenishment of supplies was impossible and the fundamental nature of the conflict was altered.

Such a dilemma is recognized by the rebels. For instance one combatant, writing in mid-2000, speaks of his unit's inability to replenish food supplies from empty villages:

We are also here still surviving, but I am getting no time to continue with my duties due to lack of food. Where we have been getting food is remaining so little and we do not have any other means of getting more. . . If there will be any alternative we would change and go to

²⁴ This last cost depends on the actions of the government as well as the ferocity of the rebel violence; it is a standard anti-insurgency technique to clear an area of civilians in order to root out the rebels (see, for example, Kalyvas 2000: 6).

another destination at least for these months in order to allow time for food to grow again. Take note that men are very weak due to food scarcity in the area.²⁵

Given the dilemma faced by the rebels with regard to displacement, it is hardly surprising that their actions were interpreted in contradictory ways. The extent to which displacement was thought to be intentional was generally reflected in the perceived advantages or disadvantages for the rebels. Thus a number of government officials and some of the citizens interviewed claimed that displacement was an intentional strategy because it was a sign of power over the people and it generated resources for the rebels. As an intelligence officer in Bundibugyo said: “They think they have achieved their goal by having people in the camps.”²⁶ Or, in the words of a displaced person, “They meant people to leave the village. They gain the stability in those areas. They got free food. They had security there, and shelter . . . They had a base now; in those villages, they built a base for their strategies.”²⁷

By contrast, others claimed that the rebels did not mean for displacement to happen. One government official talked of displacement as an unintended outcome for the ADF, interpreting the attacks as an attempt to create fear so that civilians would be coerced into supporting the insurgency.²⁸ The head of Bundibugyo’s World Food Programme office agreed: “I think [for the ADF] they would never have wanted those camps there in the first place, because [the civilians] are not harvesting their gardens, supplying food. Also, they could use those people as a shield—they could move among them.”²⁹ This was a view shared by many of the rebels. As one ex-combatant said, “We did not want the villages to be empty because we could not get information and assistance from the villagers. Displacement was not our strategy.”³⁰

For the majority of victims of displacement, however, there was general confusion over why the rebels had committed atrocities against the civilians. This confusion reflects the same paucity of explanations for why the rebellion was occurring in the first place. It reflects

²⁵ Letter from Sulamani Maake to “Afande,” 3 Jun 2000.

²⁶ Interview with Special Branch representative, Bundibugyo, 12 Aug 2002.

²⁷ Interview in Harugale IDP camp, 12 Aug 2002.

²⁸ Interview with intelligence officer, Aug 2002.

²⁹ Interview in Bundibugyo, 14 Aug 2002.

³⁰ Interview with ex-combatant #1, 17 Oct 2002.

the ambiguity at the heart of a war in which rebels who were supposedly fighting “the government” made civilians the primary victims. A displaced French teacher, who had learned French while a refugee in Zaire during a previous conflict, commented, “Their goal is to kill us. We’re poor and they want to kill us. We don’t have guns and they slaughter us like chickens. If they wanted war, they should go to the soldiers.” He paused, and advanced the paradox: “The rebels want to kill people in order to become the president of their government.”³¹

Displacement is a strong indication of the level of brutality leveled against the civilian population. In a war in which one of the trademarks of ADF executions was the removal of the victim’s trachea,³² it is hardly surprising that such high levels of displacement took place. As one IDP said when describing an attack on his village, “They shot at us . . . killed many people; others were slaughtered and others abducted. Women and girls were raped and defiled . . . They burnt people in houses, even my three children and wife were burnt in the hut.”³³

What, then, can explain the violence and forced displacement in this failed rebellion, where a feuding, hungry, and sick insurgent army ended up alienating their only hope of success?

IV. Explaining the violence

Before evaluating explanations for the violence against civilians perpetrated by the ADF, we quickly summarize the stylized facts that must be consistent with any successful account. There was a slow, peaceful start with limited successes, followed by a volatile period with civilian targeting, raiding, and abductions. This violence was both intentional and questioned by the combatants in the field. The civilian population reacted with a universal evacuation of the villages, congregating in IDP camps, with support—and some coercion—from the government. Raids on these camps followed that produced little potential political gain and limited economic gain for the insurgents. External funding existed in the rebellion,

³¹ Interview in Kanyamulima IDP camp, 12 Aug 2002.

³² Interview with government official, Bundibugyo, 12 Aug 2002.

³³ Interview in Kitengya IDP camp, 13 Aug 2002.

and money flowed from the headquarters to the field, even as violent field operations contributed to the units' financial viability.

Non-rational explanations

We first consider an anarchic portrayal of the violence against civilians. This draws from the view of the insurgency as either decentralized criminality (Ugandan President Museveni referred to the ADF leaders as “bandits;” *New Vision* 2001) or uncontrolled, frenzied killers. Such views are easily rejected. The correspondence indicates a chain of command and reports the killing of civilians along with other military advances. Moreover, the documents imply that money is not flowing from the field units to the headquarters (what one would expect from organized crime disguised as rebellion), rather in the opposite direction. Conducting the violent operations is seen as a privilege rather than a right of the field units, as suggested by the complaint that one insurgent's peers had just committed an operation and still wanted more money. Finally, rebels are taught proper “behavior” befitting the ADF and are punished by their peers and superiors when they step out of line.

An adventitious view is more challenging to discard. The primary evidence against this is the feedback from the field that the anti-civilian strategy is not working very well. When a rebel soldier writes to his superior that “our tactics may result to civilians running away” and that “we may be constructing as well as destroying” one does not get the sense that massacring civilians was a practice happened upon by field units and subsequently adopted by leadership. Additionally, the increased use of violence occurs at the same time as reduced morale, lower civilian support and contact, and higher destitution within the insurgency. If we believe that this bad turn of fortune did not occur in spite of the strategy of targeting civilians, and perhaps because of it, it is difficult to see the rebellion efficiently evolving from a cooperative political operation into an anti-civilian bloodbath. On the contrary, field units that experimented with such tactics would be shunned and reprimanded by the rest of the army.

Rational explanations

Most explanations of rational violence in civil war are what we label as strategic; they see violence as both intentional and crucial to the war aims of the party. By rejecting the non-

rational explanations of the violence, we argue that the violence was intended and calculated. Yet we have also argued that the violence against civilians in western Uganda had long-term costs to the ADF in the form of losing any potential civilian support, losing long-run economic support, and creating vulnerability in the form of an anti-insurgency campaign that cleared the area of civilians. A strategic view of violence requires that the atrocities be in the military interest of the warring party. Certainly there were military advantages of the displacement induced by the violence: the raids were immediately profitable in the form of loot and recruits; the ADF would not be bothered by government informants; and they could utilize the territory for their operations. Yet these gains were only short-run in nature.

It is therefore possible that the violence committed by the ADF was strategic; however, this requires that the short-run gains outweighed the long-run costs in the insurgent leaders' calculations.³⁴ In other words, the insurgents were strategic but also impatient. Such an explanation is intuitively appealing: after all, poor individuals often act impatiently by taking out high-interest, short-term loans. The same might be expected, therefore, of poor insurgencies.

A closer look at this claim reveals a quagmire. Given that the violent campaigns of the insurgency do not seem to be generating anything beyond operating expenses, and that the campaigns themselves occurred with the approval of the rebel superiors, it is not clear just whose impatience makes this ultimately-detrimental practice optimal from a war-making standpoint. Moreover, impatient people are not normally drawn into attempting high-cost, low-probability-of-success institutional change. In fact, the fundamental reason states are stable in the first place, according to economist Douglas North (1982: 31), is the "free-rider problem": even if people want a different set of institutions, no one wants to do the work to make that happen. When people are able to overcome the free-rider problem, they would not typically be myopic, looking for a short-term gain. Yet the ADF resorted to deleterious violence just a year into their insurgency, in a sense blowing any real prospects for change, which casts doubt on a strategic view of violence in the conflict.

Thus far we have argued that the violence against civilians in this failed rebellion was calculated yet of no direct military advantage or, in reality, a military disadvantage. Short of

³⁴ We do not refer to the foot soldiers' calculations. A reviewer pointed out that individual insurgents may have goals, such as serving the organization with honor, that are consistent with the payoff dynamics.

saying the ADF leaders simply erred in their calculations (then how to explain the attacks on IDP camps, after the strikes on the villages had fared so poorly?), we therefore favor a coupled view of the atrocities. Civilians were collateral damage in the ADF's pursuit of some other policy.

Berman describes anti-civilian activity on the part of radical religious militias as fundamental in securing troop loyalty. This mechanism is likely not operational in western Uganda as it relies on the public identification of militia members. An act of violence will only lower a militia member's "outside options" if he is identified with that act. Yet the ADF would occasionally conduct raids dressed in UPDF uniforms. To add, the displacement—the main outcome of the violent activity—was an essentially anonymous process; some villagers moved to the IDP camps when they heard rumors of attacks on neighboring villages. Had the ADF wanted to secure member loyalty through anti-civilian acts, they could have chosen a more public modality of interacting with the civilians.

Similarly, Jenkins' description of anti-civilian violence as a means to provoke a harsh countermeasure seems an unlikely fit for the ADF raids. Though the ADF did distribute anti-government propaganda after the civilians congregated in IDP camps, this can hardly be seen as a winning strategy. The region strongly supported Museveni's government, and the rebel's raids further alienated the ADF from the population; UPDF soldiers were widely seen as protectors, even if they failed to prevent attacks on the IDP camps.

Our explanation: the financier-insurgent relationship

Outside financing is widely known to affect the course of civil wars. While scholars have written about the effect of outside financing on the viability (Byman et al, 2001) and duration (Regan, 2002) of rebellion, they have had little to say on the impact of outside financing on violence against civilians beyond side speculation, and, to add, these speculations are inconsistent with one another. For example, Greene (1990) reasons that, "it seems clear that the level of violence is raised when foreign intervention supports the revolutionaries or, after their capture of power, their counterrevolutionary opponents" (104-105). On the other hand, Kalyvas (1999: 275) predicts that mass insurgent violence will be "less likely where insurgents are dependent on external aid (hence defection will be less costly)." For Kalyvas, insurgents who are cash-rich will not be as damaged from civilian

defections to the incumbent as poor insurgents, so therefore would be less likely to turn to coercion as a preventative device. For Greene, more intervention will raise the stakes and result in more bloodshed. Yet neither author considers the intricacies of the financier-insurgent relationship. A recent RAND study reviews post-war insurgency financing and examines eight distortionary effects of external aid on the conduct of the insurgency (Byman et al 2001: 100-102), however none of these have obvious predictions on the level of anti-civilian violence.

A closer examination of the relationship between the rebels and their patrons suggests three hypotheses that can, individually or jointly, explain the violence. We see the financier-insurgent dynamics as a textbook example of a principal-agent problem. Here, the financier is the principal and he has hired the insurgent as his agent to conduct a rebellion. This alone is sufficient to explain a higher level of anti-civilian violence than would characterize an insurgency trying to win hearts and minds:

Hypothesis no. 1: The financier has a different set of goals than the insurgent. Such goals may favor destabilization over success. The insurgent may compromise his goals in order to continue receiving funding for the rebellion.

As the RAND authors write of state support for insurgencies, “Because regime change is difficult, outside governments often lower their expectations and settle for weakening a rival and otherwise extending their influence” (33-34). A very effective way to weaken a rival is to reduce the level of security of its citizens. A Ugandan intelligence officer told us that the ADF’s goal in the raids and displacement was to “make the people see as if government is not helping them anymore.”³⁵ Thus Congo and/or Sudan, playing tit-for-tat in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma,³⁶ may have been more interested in a cheap campaign to destabilize western Uganda than a costly run at the Kampala government, and they may have found insurgents willing to include the violence as their tactics.

³⁵ Anonymous interview, Aug 2002.

³⁶ Byman et al (2001) cite “payback” as the reason states in the Great Lakes region may support the insurgencies: “Anti-government Sudanese groups have received support from Khartoum’s neighbors largely because Sudan has backed local insurgencies elsewhere” (34).

Even if the financier were genuinely interested in overthrowing the government of Uganda, adding one small assumption to the principal-agent relationship can explain the excess violence. As with many principal-agent problems, we characterize the financier-insurgent relationship as one of asymmetric information: the insurgent has hidden information. We believe the two most important parts of this information are the “type” of the insurgent and the information of the battleground. Only the insurgent knows whether he is committed to the goals of the insurgency or simply playing along in order to continue receiving funding from the financier. In addition, the insurgent knows the area and the likelihood of success of different strategies much better than the financier. Indeed, according to the RAND study, “Insurgents, because of their access to sources in the area of conflict, are most likely *suppliers* of information to external supporters rather than *recipients* of intelligence from outside actors” (98, italics original).

This leads us to a second hypothesis:

Hypothesis no. 2: Asymmetric information between the insurgent and the financier may lead the insurgent to commit an excessively visible campaign in order to signal to the financier that he is committed to the rebellion.

As the financier cannot tell whether the insurgent is committed, and what the actual battle realities are, the insurgent is faced with a problem: if he does not conduct observable operations, the financier may think he is shirking and not serious about the rebellion. To illustrate this point we provide a simple model: the insurgent can either “convince” or “coerce.” Only the insurgent knows which one of these is the correct strategy. Moreover, convincing is unobservable to the financier. In this model, when the insurgent claims to be convincing, the financier is unable to distinguish whether the insurgent is conducting the correct policy or simply shirking. If lazy insurgents are common and even the correct strategy has a low chance of success, the only way for the insurgent to communicate to the financier that he is committed to the rebellion may be to coerce. This coercion could take the form of massacres that are actually inefficient from a military perspective.

Still a third hypothesis is plausible that requires neither asymmetric information nor differing goals, but arises due to contracting problems:

Hypothesis no. 3: The financier and the insurgent may only be able to contract on tasks rather than outcomes. This can lead to a task-heavy rebellion that under-invests in processes associated with the outcomes but not with the contracted tasks.

We believe there may be imperfect contractibility arising primarily from the inherent uncertainty of conducting a rebellion. Ideally, the principal could simply pay the agent for a successful rebellion and not pay him for an unsuccessful rebellion. The agent would then demand a fee in the event of success high enough that his expected value from entering this relationship would make him accept the offer, then work hard to see the rebellion through. Clearly, this misses the point—rebellions are expensive and, moreover, they are very hard to win even if the insurgents are committed. Insurgent leaders are not typically the types of individuals who can float bonds or take out loans in order to finance their effort, nor are most insurgencies run where such financial markets are well developed. Moreover, such a type of contracting would run into an incentive problem after the fact: in the event the insurgent completes the rebellion, the financier already has met his goals so will not pay the insurgent for the work completed; therefore, the insurgent will not do the work in the first place.

A more realistic way to view the financing would be by the job. The financier pays the insurgent for each task that he completes. This longer-term relationship facilitates trust and prevents the need for the cash-strapped insurgent to seek operational funds from other sources. Yet it also has costs: some processes of the insurgency are difficult to describe or involve constant low-level activity and effort. If the insurgent only gets paid for the larger tasks, these lower-level processes will receive reduced attention. In addition, related to the previous hypothesis, some tasks may be easier to observe, and therefore evaluate, than others. In an effort to have credible, effective contracting, the insurgency may take on too many observable tasks and not enough covert diligence. Massacring villagers makes the newspapers, but gaining the sympathy of shop owners does not.

V. Implications and Conclusions

In this paper, we have argued that there are a variety of ways to understand violence against civilians during civil war. These understandings of violence can be divided according to the assumptions they make about the rationality or intentionality of the violence, and whether the violence contributes, or is incidental, to the military goals of the aggressor. Most rational understandings of violence have been based on case studies where the violence is particularly brazen and the rebellion at least relatively successful. This will lead to an overestimation of the optimality of violence in its ability to further the military ends of the conflict.

In examining the case of a failed, marginal rebellion, we find evidence that violence perpetrated against civilians in western Uganda by the Allied Democratic Forces was an intentional and premeditated tactic of the war. However, we find little evidence that this violence directly helped the ADF militarily; the balance of evidence suggests that while the violent raids may have given the rebels small short term gains, the tactics were ultimately destructive. While the ADF may simply have miscalculated in deciding to conduct the raids, they pursued this violent strategy twice, both against villagers and against IDP camp residents, lending credence to the possibility that the correct interpretation of violence in the ADF conflict is a coupled one: the targeting of civilians was concomitant to the ADF's pursuit of some other goal.

The known details of the ADF rebellion are consistent with the level of violence being excessive due to the nature of the financier-insurgent relationship.³⁷ Three hypotheses, between which we are presently unable to test, follow from modeling this relationship as a principal-agent problem. One, the financier may simply have desired more anti-civilian violence, and the insurgent complied in order to maintain the funding. Two, the insurgent may have chosen—against his better judgment—to be violent in order to prove to the financier that he was committed to the rebellion. Three, the most feasible contracting arrangement between the financier and the insurgent may have been tied to the completion of visible tasks, a prime example of which is a headline-making massacre.

³⁷ A reviewer pointed out that the nature of the financier-insurgent relationship may affect the type of violence chosen. Some forms of violence may be better suited to pleasing the financier or signaling than they are to gaining military advantage. This would be an interesting direction for future research.

The policy implications of this factor are clear if we wish to reduce the atrocities committed against civilians. For undesired insurgencies that are sustained by outside financing, the source of funding should be cut off. Not only will this make the rebels poorer, but it will eliminate the incentives for them to commit excessive anti-civilian violence. Military campaigns by the incumbent may affect the costs and benefits of the rebels, but most likely these costs and benefits would have already been factored into the calculations of the rebels and their financiers, and some additional effort to stop the financing would be necessary to prevent the violence. For desired insurgencies that receive outside support, the contracting by the financier should condition on minimizing civilian casualties.

Probably the most pacific policy of the Ugandan government to counteract the ADF rebellion was to offer amnesty to any rebel fighters and help reintegrate them into society. This is consistent with Berman's view of militias: the government is increasing the outside options of the militia members, thus increasing their incentive to defect. While we believe this policy to be effective, the evidence from the rebellion favors more aggressive action severing the ties between the insurgents and their patrons. Uganda's recent negotiations with the Sudan to stop supporting insurgencies in the other's territory and with the DRC to withdraw its troops are steps in this direction. However, this fails to address the ADF's potential ties to fundamentalist religious groups or non-neighboring countries.

If we were able to distinguish which of the three hypotheses of the financier-insurgent relationship is driving the excess violence, we might arrive at more creative policy interventions. For example, if the asymmetric information were driving the violence, a representative of the financier could be shown the "true" story; namely, that the violence against the civilians is causing more harm than good for the insurgency. Of course, the incumbent would have little incentive to conduct such a policy, as it could lead to the insurgents adopting the correct tactic.

And other insurgencies

This analysis should be applicable to any insurgency where outside financing is sustaining the campaign. The extremist Islamic movements in the Philippines, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Algeria, and the state-sponsored insurgencies in Tajikistan and the Balkans

are examples of rebellions that would benefit from greater investigation into the links between outside finance and anti-civilian violence.

It is important to note that where rebellions are self-sustaining, even with external financing, severing the financier-insurgent tie may not make as much sense. In a rebellion over mineral resources, for example, the financier is not so crucial: he may just be a keen entrepreneur, or have helped in getting initial supplies to get the insurgency running. Rebellions in Sierra Leone or the eastern DRC would probably not benefit much from patrons' support being pulled. At one extreme, these wars could get more brutal without outside funding if financing currently allows the rebels to work on a large enough scale to bypass especially coercive tactics.

The majority of insurgencies in the 1990s benefited from outside support, and the supporters do not have the hundreds of millions of dollars that characterized US and Soviet aid to insurgencies during the Cold War (Byman et al, 2001). Still, the high level of poverty in the countries where most of these insurgencies take place will ensure that the recruiting of foot soldiers will continue to be possible. Thus there is great potential for rebellions that have no legitimate hope of reaching the capital to continue for many years, accompanied by socially-destructive tactics that are not even crucial to the military ends of the rebels. These rebellions further destabilize the region of conflict, making future funding more necessary and feasible.

It is in these rebellions that the nexus between terrorism, foreign policy, and interstate war finds itself. Outright interstate war is increasingly rare, yet hostility is as high as ever. When diplomacy fails and traditional war is a non-credible threat, states must turn to credible and destructive means to affect the behavior of their neighbors. Urban terrorism is one method of achieving this—in fact, the ADF are widely suspected for several bombings in Kampala—however it requires operating far from safe havens, and will normally provoke the incumbent's full efforts to quash. Peripheral, doomed rebellion is another method to hold leverage within a country. It almost seems a perfect bargaining chip to exert pressure on another head of state, as the plug can easily be pulled on a rebellion that is destructive precisely because it is dependent.

REFERENCES

Achieng, J. 1999. 'Rebels Acquire Better Training and Weaponry.' *Interpress Third World News Agency*. 27 Dec.

African Rights. 2001. *Avoiding an Impasse: Understanding Conflicts in Western Uganda*. Mimeo: Kampala, Uganda.

Amnesty International Canada. 2000. 'Sierra Leone: Childhood—A Casualty of Conflict.' AFR 51/069/00. <http://www.amnesty.ca/library/afr5106900.htm>.

BBC News. 1999. 'Uganda offers amnesty to rebels.' 7 Dec. [BBCnews/Africa/Uganda offers amnesty to rebels](http://www.bbcnews.com/Africa/Uganda_offers_amnesty_to_rebels).

Berman, E. 2003. ' Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias.' *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series*. No. 10004.

Brummit, C. 2001. 'Scores die in brutal ethnic fighting in Indonesian province.' *Associated Press*. Jakarta: 22 Feb.

Byman, D.L., P. Chalk, B. Hoffman, W. Rosenau, and D. Brannan. 2001. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica: RAND.

Fearon, J.D. 1995. 'Rationalist Explanations for War.' *International Organization* 49: 379-414.

Fearon, J.D. and D.D. Laitin. 2000. 'Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.' *International Organization* 54: 845-877.

Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and I. Cohn. 1994. *Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Greene, T.H. 1990. *Comparative Revolutionary Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Gurr, T.R. and J.A. Goldstone. 1991. 'Comparisons and Policy Implications.' In *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*, ed. J.A. Goldstone, T.R. Gurr, and F. Moshiri, 324-352. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Hayden, W. 1998. 'The Conflict in Kosovo and Forced Migration: The Strategic Use of Displacement and the Obstacles to International Protection.' *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. <http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/b/b396.htm>.

Hirshleifer, J. 1995. 'Anarchy and its Breakdown.' *Journal of Political Economy* 103: 26-52.

Human Rights Internet. 2000. 'Sierra Leone: Thematic Reports.'
<http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2000/vol2/sierraleonetr.htm>.

IRIN. 2002. *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. Bulletin: 29 May.

Jenkins, B.M. 1970. 'The Five Stages of Urban Guerrilla Warfare: Challenges of the 1970s.' Paper presented to the Working Group on Military Operations in Urban Areas of the Military Operations Research Symposium at the Naval Post Graduate School, 17 Nov 1970.

Kaldor, M. 1999. *New and Old Wars*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kalyvas, S. 1999. 'Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria.' *Rationality and Society* 11: 243-285.

Kalyvas, S. 2000. 'The Logic of Violence in Civil War.' Mimeo:
www.duke.edu/web/licep/1/kalyvas/kalyvaspaper.pdf.

Keene, D. 1994. 'The Functions of Famine in Southwestern Sudan: Implications for Relief.' In *War & Hunger: Rethinking international responses to complex emergencies*, ed. J. Macrae and A. B. Zwi, 111-124. London: Zed Books.

Krain, M. 1997. 'State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41: 331-360.

Macrae, J. and A.B. Zwi. 1992. 'Food as an Instrument of War in Contemporary African Famines: A Review of the Evidence.' *Disasters* 16: 299-321.

Melson, R. 1992. *Revolution and Genocide: The Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

New Vision. 2001. 'War Over, Says Museveni.' Kampala: 12 Feb 2001.

North, D. 1982. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Oxfam, Kabarole Research Institute and DED-Uganda. 2002. 'The Challenges and hopes for Protection and Resettlement of Internally Displaced people in the Rwenzori Region, With Policy Recommendations.' Mimeo, Kampala: 8 Feb 2002.

Peterson, S. and S. Robinson. 1992. 'US Marines go ashore in Somalia.' *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 Dec 1992, p. 1.

Regan, P. 2002. 'Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46: 55-73.

Smucker, P. and F. Bowers. 2003. 'Iraq Regime Linked to Terror Group.' *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 Apr 2003, p. 1.

US Department of State. 2002a. 'Terrorist Exclusion List.' Washington, DC: Office for the Coordination of Counterterrorism. 15 Nov 2002.
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/15222.htm>.

US Department of State. 2002b. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*. Washington DC: Office for the Coordination of Counterterrorism. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/pdf/>.

Valentino, B., P. Huth, and D. Balch-Lindsay. 2004. 'Draining the Sea: Mass Killing, Genocide, and Guerrilla Warfare.' *International Organization*, forthcoming.

Figure A: A typology of understanding violence in civil war

		<i>Degree of planning</i>	
		Uncalculated	Calculated
<i>Relevance to military aims</i>	Incidental	Anarchical	Coupled
	Crucial	Adventitious	Strategic